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ALBANY GOVERNMENT LAW REVIEW
The ongoing problems in the housing and credit markets,
caused by a toxic combination of wholesale deregulation of
financial markets by the federal government and imprudent
lending and investment practices by financial institutions, pose
significant challenges to local and state government officials.
Some of these challenges are obvious. How will cities cope with
an unprecedented number of foreclosures at the same time that
state and local tax revenues are decreasing? When will access to
credit ease in a municipal bond market that has constricted as a
result of both general credit concerns and questions about the
companies insuring those bonds? As the magnitude and
seriousness of the current financial crisis becomes clearer, these
obvious concerns may prove to be only the precursor to daunting
new challenges. This article discusses the implications of the
current financial crisis for local governments.
I. How DID WE GET HERE?
The current financial crisis is the latest version of an all too
familiar scenario: corporations and individuals seeking to
maximize profits exploit markets that have insufficient
regulatory safeguards to protect shareholders and the public. In
just the past two decades we have seen this scenario play out
twice previously with disastrous results. First, in the Savings &
Loan scandal of the late 1980s and early 1990s,' and second in
the corporate accounting scandal exemplified by the collapse of
the Enron Corporation in 2001.2 We are now in the midst of an
Act Three whose potential repercussions appear to dwarf the
prior two.
The current crisis has its roots in the housing market. Starting
in the late 1990s, Wall Street investment bankers seeking to
maximize profits, and "Main Street" mortgage brokers seeking to
increase their income, entered a housing market marked both by
an unprecedented ease of the availability of credit to homebuyers
and lax government regulation.3 Traditionally, most home
1 See generally MARTIN MAYER, THE GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY: THE
COLLAPSE OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY (1990) (explaining the collapse of
the savings and loan industry).
2 See generally KURT EICHENWALD, CONSPIRACY OF FOOLS: A TRUE STORY
(2005) (discussing the Enron scandal and the demise of its executives).
I Michael E. Stone, Pernicious Problems of Housing Finance, in A RIGHT TO
HOUSING: FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SOCIAL AGENDA 82, 85 (Rachel G. Bratt et al.
eds., 2006) (discussing problems surrounding housing finance). See also R.
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mortgages were issued from banks or savings institutions that
held and serviced those same mortgages.4  These thrift
institutions based their lending on relatively strict standards that
considered the borrower's income, credit rating and amount of
down payment, because they remained at risk for the borrower's
default for the life of the loan. This traditional system began to
change dramatically about a decade ago.5 In the late 1990s, real
estate was seen as undervalued in relation to other assets.6 At
the same time, investment bankers and mortgage brokers were
transforming the mortgage loan industry.7 An ever-increasing
number of mortgage loans were originated by mortgage brokers,
rather than traditional lending institutions.8 Many of these
mortgages were so-called subprime loans, often made with little
or no regard to the suitability of the mortgage for the particular
borrower or the borrower's ability to repay.9  In too many
instances, particularly in minority low-income neighborhoods,
there was outright fraud by mortgage brokers and appraisers."0
This transition was fueled in large part by the introduction of
securitization into the home mortgage market. Simply put,
Christopher Whalen, The Subprime Crisis - Cause, Effect and Consequences, 17
J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMM. DEV. L. 219, 222-23 (2008) (describing the
consequences of relaxed regulatory controls and documentation requirements).
4 Stone, supra note 3, at 85.
Id. at 83. See James M. Murray, Keeping REITS on Track for Investors and
Residents, UNITS, June 1, 1996 (describing real estate investors' practice of
buying undervalued property after the real estate market bottomed out in 1990).
But see Whalen, supra note 3, at 222 (describing the subsequent relaxation of
mortgage lending standards).
6 Stone, supra note 3, at 91; Carlos Tejada, All-Star Analysts 1999 Survey:
Home Construction, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1999, at R7.
7 See ROBERT GROSSE, THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES 184 (2004)
(describing the influence of investment banks); Stone, supra note 3, at 91
(addressing the shift in the mortgage-backed securities market).
8 MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION, RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE ORIGINATION
CHANNELS 1-2 (2006). See also MAJORITY STAFF OF THE JOINT ECON. COMM.,
110TH CONG., THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON WEALTH,
PROPERTY VALUES AND TAx REVENUES, AND How WE GOT HERE 17 (Comm. Print
2007) [hereinafter JOINT ECON. COMM.I (noting that "the overwhelming majority
[of mortgages underwritten by subprime lenders] originated through mortgage
brokers.").
9 See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning A Blind Eye: Wall
Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2043, 2045,
2093 n.4 (2007) (outlining the issues posed by predatory lending in the subprime
home mortgage market).
10 Id. at 2044; Kermit J. Lind, The Perfect Storm: An Eyewitness Report from
Ground Zero in Cleveland's Neighborhoods, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMM.
DEV. L. 237, 238 (2008).
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securitization is the creation and marketing of bonds based on
pools of mortgages that are "sliced and diced" into pieces and then
"bundled" into investments.'1 These mortgage-backed securities
proved extremely attractive to investors, many from outside the
United States, largely because they offered high rates of return
combined with claims that these instruments had been
structured to shield purchasers from much of the risk of default.12
As demand for mortgage-backed securities increased, the
mortgage industry scrambled to find ways to increase the supply
of new loans. It soon came up with ever-more exotic forms of
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs); dramatically increased the
number of subprime loans (i.e., loans to borrowers with lower
credit scores); and took numerous other steps to extend credit to
borrowers who had previously been unable to obtain home
mortgages.'3 Borrowers could obtain a mortgage with little or no
proof of income and with little or no down payment. 4 A
prospective homeowner could take out a second mortgage at the
time of purchase, make interest-only payments for up to fifteen
years, skip payments by reducing equity or, in some cases, obtain
a mortgage that exceeded the home's value.'5
Several other factors fueled the process and planted the seeds
for the current crisis. In the wake of the economic jolts caused by
the dot-com bust in 2000 and the reaction to the 9/11 attacks in
2001, the Federal Reserve under Alan Greenspan reduced
interest rates to historic lows and kept them there for several
years, making mortgage financing rates extremely attractive. As
with any "hot" market, investors gave into the temptation to
speculate by leveraging their investments. Both institutional
investors in the securitized mortgages and real estate speculators
purchasing homes followed the same strategy. Buy the asset -
whether bond or house - with a little bit of your own cash and
lots of borrowed funds - e.g., a $5,000 down-payment on a
$500,000 house - and then reap a windfall profit by selling the
house six months later for $550,000, turning your $5,000
'" Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 2045, 2049; Possible Responses to Rising
Mortgage Foreclosures: Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin. Serv., 110th Cong. 4
(2007) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.).
12 Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 2046.
" Ron Paul, Editorial, Bailout Will Lead to Rough Economic Ride, CNN.COM,
Sept. 23, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/09/23/paul.bailout/ (last
visited Nov. 2, 2008); JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 8, at 2.
14 Paul, supra note 13.
15 See, e.g., JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 8.
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investment into $50,000. As long as the underlying assets were
increasing in value, things were fine. But once values began to
slip, speculators found they owed more than the asset could yield
after sale. When that happens to housing speculators, the home
ends up in foreclosure. When it happens to a hedge fund that
borrowed $99 million of the $100 million purchase price for
mortgage-backed bonds that then lose thirty-five percent of their
value, the result is the collapse of the fund.
The positive side of these developments was a significant
increase in the rate of home ownership, from 64.2% in 1994 to
69.2% in 2004, the highest percentage of home ownership ever
recorded by the U.S. Census Bureau.'6 As subsequent events
have shown, however, many of these new homeowners were
highly susceptible to changes in their economic position and the
housing market. So long as the housing market remained strong,
with increasing prices and brisk sales, homeowners who faced a
steep increase in their mortgage payments when their ARM's low
"teaser-rate" expired could simply re-finance, or even sell, to avoid
becoming delinquent on their payments. But when the housing
market began cooling off in 2006, and there was an increase in
both short and long-term interest rates, many homeowners were
unable either to refinance or sell and were left with no option but
to default on their mortgages.
In December, 2007, the Mortgage Bankers Association (the
Association) reported that home foreclosures were at their
highest level since the Association had begun reporting such data
in 1971, with over 900,000 households, representing 2.04% of all
mortgages, in the foreclosure process at that time.'7 Home
foreclosures and the rate of homes entering the foreclosure
process have continued reaching record highs in 2008. In early
September, the Association reported that at the end of the second
quarter of 2008 the percentage of loans in foreclosure had risen to
2.75%; the seasonally adjusted rate of mortgages entering the
foreclosure process that quarter was 1.19%, almost double the
rate (0.65%) seen in the second quarter of 2007; and the mortgage
delinquency rate for all mortgages (the percentage of loans
16 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau News, Census Bureau Reports on
Residential Vacancies and Home Ownership (Jul. 24, 2008).
'1 Les Christie, Foreclosures Hit All-Time High, CNNMoNEY.coM, Mar. 6,
2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/06/realestate/defaultscontinueclimb/index.htm
?postversion=2008030614 (last visited Nov. 2, 2008).
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delinquent ninety or more days) was 6.41%, the highest rate since
the Association began its current method of measuring
delinquency status in 1979.8
The foreclosure crisis and accompanying collapse of the
housing market have had unanticipated repercussions
throughout the economy. Access to credit tightened dramatically
during the summer of 2007-as a result of growing uncertainty
about the true value of the various financial instruments created
to further the securitization of mortgage debts. 9 Not long after,
we learned that major bond insurers were on the verge of default,
further tightening access to credit." By the spring of 2008, the
effects of the collapse of the housing and mortgage credit markets
had wreaked havoc in capital markets and among Wall Street
investment banking firms in ways not seen since the first years of
the Great Depression.
In March, Bear Stearns was taken over for pennies on the
dollar by J.P. Morgan in a "rescue" scheme orchestrated by the
Federal Reserve Bank, which included the Fed's pledge of credit
for Bear Stearns's bad investments.2  Six months later, in
September 2008, this country experienced turmoil among its
financial institutions not seen, once again, since the Great
Depression. On September 8th, the federal government
announced that it was taking control of the nation's two largest
mortgage finance institutions, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The
two mortgage giants would operate under a federal
conservatorship administered by the Federal Housing Finance
Agency, newly-created for just that purpose.22 Less than a week
later, on September 14th, persistent rumors that the Wall Street
investment bank Lehman Brothers was in perilous financial
condition proved well-founded when the firm filed for bankruptcy
IS Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, Delinquencies and Foreclosures
Increase in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (Sept. 5, 2008).
"9 See Joseph Lanzkron, The Hedge Fund Holdup: The SEC's Repeated
Unnecessary Attacks on the Hedge Fund Industry, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 1509, 1509
n.1 (2008) (discussing the impact of constricting credit on the markets as early
as the summer of 2007).
20 Liz Rappaport & Serena Ng, Bond Insurers Inflict Further Pain on the
Market - Big Banks May See More Write-Downs; Munis Feel Pinched, WALL ST.
J., June 21, 2008, at B1.
21 See Landon Thomas Jr., Swinging Optimism and Dread on Wall Street,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 19, 2008, at C1 (revealing the conflict between stakeholders
surrounding J.P. Morgan's takeover of Bear Stearns).
22 Mark Trumbull, Fannie and Freddie: Why the Takeover, THE CHRISTIAN
ScI. MONITOR, Sept. 8, 2008, at 1.
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protection after federal officials refused to bail-out the firm as it
had Bear Stearns six months earlier.23 On the same day, the
venerable brokerage giant Merrill Lynch was acquired by Bank of
America. 4 One day later, September 15th, news came that the
giant insurance company, A.I.G., was facing crippling losses,25
and only an unprecedented infusion pledge of up to $85 billion in
loans over two years by the Federal Reserve Bank saved the firm
from imminent collapse.26
The A.I.G. bailout apparently confirmed to world financial
markets that the American financial system was in danger of
collapse and could be rescued only if the federal government
adopted a more comprehensive strategy to deal with the problem.
The markets were sending clear signals to Washington that ad
hoc rescue decisions on a firm-by-firm basis were an inadequate
response and Washington adjusted its strategy. On September
19th, Treasury Secretary Paulson proposed an unprecedented
$700 billion "bailout" scheme for the nation's financial
institutions.27 Following days of tense negotiations between -
and within - the Republican and Democratic Congressional
leadership, the leaders and the President agreed to a revised
rescue plan, but it failed to win approval when brought to a
House vote on September 29th.28  The markets signaled their
disapproval: the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell nearly 800
points and credit markets tightened even more. 29 After further
revision in the Senate, which overwhelmingly approved its
version of the scheme on October 1st,3° enough House members
switched their vote to approve the measure when it came back for
a second vote on October 3rd.3
23 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Merrill is Sold - Failing to Find Buyer, Lehman
Bros. is Set to Wind Down, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at Al.
24 Id.
25 Stephen Labaton, Dow Drops 4.4%o, Officials Try to Stem Crisis - Concern
on Big Insurer, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at Al.
26 Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Gets Control, Policy Reversal Arises From
Growing Fear of Global Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at Al.
27 David M. Herszenhorn, Goes to Congress - Treasury Would Face Few
Restrictions on Buying Bad Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, at Al.
28 Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Leaders Rebuffed in 228-205 Vote -
Broad Public Anger is Cited, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at Al.
29 Joe Nocera, 36 Hours of Alarm and Action as Crisis Spiraled, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 2008, at Al.
30 Carl Hulse, Senate Approves Bailout Proposal by a Wide Margin; In House,
Leaders of Both Parties Hope the Revised Bill Passes by Friday, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
2, 2008, at Al.
31 David M. Herszenhorn, Bush Signs Bill - House Votes 263 to 171 -
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II. SHORT TERM EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT
A. Revenue Shortfalls
The most obvious repercussion from the housing/credit crisis
for local government is its affect on municipal revenues.
Homeowners who are in default on their mortgages or in
foreclosure are often also defaulting on their property taxes or are
in tax foreclosure, so real property tax proceeds are depressed.
Further, tax proceeds from properties whose owners are current
on their mortgage will also be negatively affected because the
decline in property value will lead owners to seek a reduction in
their property tax assessments; the same thing will occur when
someone buys a home for less than its current valuation for tax
purposes. The steep drop in housing sales also means that
proceeds from real estate transfer taxes are significantly reduced.
The housing/credit crisis also reduces sales and income tax
revenue. Homeowners with mortgage problems will normally cut
back on other spending in an effort to avoid default, and may
choose to accumulate some savings, rather than spend, if default
cannot be avoided. Even homeowners without mortgage
problems are likely to reduce spending. First, as homes are the
most valuable asset for most families, the reduction in home
value makes them feel less wealthy and reduces their ability to
tap into the home's equity - factors that lead households to cut
back on expenditures.32 Even households that have significant
assets in addition to their homes will likely have seen a
significant decline in their investments over the past two years,
another factor which tends to reduce spending. Second, many
households will react to more difficult economic times by
targeting any "surplus" dollars to debt reduction. All of the above
results in a reduction in spending and therefore a reduction in
general sales tax revenues. Cities that rely heavily on "targeted"
sales tax proceeds from largely discretionary purchases such as
tobacco, alcohol, entertainment, hotels and restaurants, may
suffer even larger reductions. Finally, the housing/credit crisis,
along with soaring energy prices, have now led to a serious
economic downturn and rising unemployment,33 so municipal
Markets Down on Jobs Data, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at Al.
32 Louis Uchitelle et al., Full of Doubts, U.S. Shoppers Cut Spending, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 6, 2008, at Al.
33 The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported in September that the
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income tax revenues are also in steep decline.
B. Increasing Costs
While the housing/foreclosure part of the crisis has reduced
revenues, it is also increasing costs for cities. Many cities,
especially those in low/no-growth areas, rightly believe that it is
in their long-term interest to spend money to try to prevent
foreclosures and property abandonment and to monitor vacant
properties (or even provide minimal exterior maintenance, e.g.,
grass-cutting) in an effort to maintain neighborhood stability and
prevent even further reductions in property values.34 That belief
is validated by published research demonstrating that the value
of surrounding properties declines by 0.9% on average for each
foreclosed house in the vicinity, with the decline even greater in
low-income neighborhoods at 1.44%." Based on that research,
the Center for Responsible Lending has estimated that
homeowners living near foreclosed properties will see their
property value decrease on average about $5,000.36 The Center's
most recent forecast, in January 2008, projects that nationally,
foreclosures on subprime home loans originated in 2005 and 2006
will lead to a loss of value for 40.6 million neighboring homes,
with the resulting decline in house values and tax base from
nearby foreclosures totaling $202 billion.37
Abandoned and vacant properties also impose higher police,
fire, and sanitary costs on cities, particularly those with older
housing stocks and weak housing demand. Such properties, if not
appropriately secured, can quickly become targets for vandals or
seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in August 2008 was 6.1%, an increase
in relative terms of 41.7% over the 4.7% rate in August 2007. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT
POPULATION SURVEY: 1998-2008, available at
http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?datatool=latest numbers
&seriesid=LNS14000000.
14 See, e.g., Jason Alley, Battling Foreclosures: Cities to Receive Grant, THE
NEWS-HERALD, Oct. 3, 2008, available at http://www.thenewsherald.com/articles/
2008/10/04/news/doc48e663c4240b9481252339.txt (noting two Downriver cities
given grant money to combat the foreclosure problem before it worsens).
31 Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure: The
Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 HOUSING
POLVY DEBATE 57, 65, 72 n.1 (2006).
36 CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SUBPRIME SPILLOVER: FORECLOSURES
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havens for squatters or criminals, further accelerating
neighborhood decline. Abandoned properties are fire hazards and
can also become public safety hazards requiring demolition at
significant cost. When a house burns or is demolished, the
resulting vacant lot can easily become a free dumping ground for
trash and debris. To help avoid these costs, cities must devote
significant resources to an "early-warning" system that will
identify vacant and abandoned properties in a timely manner and
then respond appropriately. It is clearly the better approach, but
still results in increased costs at a time when revenue is
decreasing.
A number of cities have taken aggressive action to address
property abandonment. In Cleveland, which has a Housing
Division as part of its Municipal Court, the presiding judge has
used the court's exclusive jurisdiction to hear nuisance abatement
cases brought pursuant to the state's receivership statute38 to
address property abandonment.39  The receivership statute
authorizes a receiver to take control of a residential structure
that has become a public nuisance and abate the nuisance while
recovering its costs through a super-priority lien." An important
feature of the statute is that the receiver need not be the plaintiff;
a community nonprofit corporation or any other qualified
property manager may be appointed as the receiver.
Buffalo, New York, has addressed its abandoned property
problem by suing twenty-eight national mortgage lenders to force
these companies to take responsibility for properties that were
abandoned after the companies initiated foreclosure and forced
the occupants to leave.4" Several cities in South Florida are
levying daily fines against mortgage banks if they fail to maintain
properties on which they have foreclosed.42  In Southern
California, some cities have adopted legislation that requires
38 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.41(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2005).
31 See Charu Gupta, Stealing Home: Slavic Village Combats the Effects of
Foreclosures at the Street Level While Waiting for Solutions, CLEV. FREE TIMES,
June 29, 2007, available at www.freetimes.com/stories/15/8/stealing-home
(noting that the number of court-ordered receiverships in Cleveland has
increased since 2005).
40 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.41(B)(1), (H)(2)(a).
41 Jonathan Epstein, City Sues Lenders Over Forgotten Houses: Buffalo
Wants Them to Pay for Demolition When Owners Are Forced Out After
Foreclosure, BUFF. NEWS, Mar. 1, 2008, at Dl.
42 Polyana da Costa & Terry Sheridan, Ugly Side Effect: Municipalities
Struggle to Clean Up Dilapidated Properties Abandoned After Foreclosure
Actions, PALM BEACH DAiLY Bus. REV., Mar. 18, 2008, at 1.
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owners, banks and other lenders to register vacant and
abandoned homes in foreclosure with the city, and imposes an
obligation to secure and maintain the homes. Failure to register,
or a violation of the ordinance, subjects the lender to fines of up to
$2,500. 43
Until the summer of 2008, federal efforts to address the
growing problems faced by cities were notable only by their
absence. In July 2008, after much criticism from local
government advocates for the federal government's failure to
address the foreclosure problem, Congress enacted, and the
President signed, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of
2008.44  Title III of the Act established the Neighborhood
Stabilization Program (NSP) to provide grants to every state, and
to local governments that met the qualifying criteria, to purchase
foreclosed or abandoned homes and to rehabilitate, resell, or
redevelop these homes in order to stabilize neighborhoods and
stem the decline of house values of neighboring homes.45 In
September, the Federal Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) announced how its distribution formula had
allocated the $3.92 billion in federal aid authorized in Title III to
address the aftermath of the crisis by following Congress'
direction that grants be targeted to areas based on the
number/percent of foreclosures, sub-prime mortgages and
mortgage defaults and delinquencies. 46  Based on the formula,
Florida received the most money ($541 million), followed by
California ($530 million), Michigan ($263.5 million) and Ohio
($258 million).47 Local officials have criticized this effort as too
little too late, in light of the needs in those areas hit hardest by
the foreclosure problem, such as Cleveland, Ohio.48
41 Karen Maeshiro, Abandoned Homes Becoming Scourge of Neighborhoods
Vacant: Palmdale Law Cracks Down on Neglect of Properties, DAILY NEWS OF
L.A., Mar. 7, 2008, at Al.
I Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 2300,
122 Stat. 2654 (2008).
41 U.S. Dept. of Housing and Development, Methodology for Allocation of
$3.92 Billion of Emergency Assistance for the Redevelopment of Abandoned and




47 This information, along with information for other states in the U.S., is
available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/communitydevelopment/programs/
neighborhoodspg/.
48 Id.; See Stephen Koff & Gabriel Baird, Ohio Gets Millions to Target
Housing U.S. Money to Help Rehab, Raze Homes, PLAIN DEALER MOBILE NEWS,
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C. Access to Credit
One of the earliest, and unanticipated, effects of the economic
crisis was the constriction of credit for local and state government
as a result of the unprecedented lowering of credit ratings for the
companies that insure municipal bonds.49  Municipal bond
insurers, who entered the market in the early 1970s, have become
an increasingly common feature of municipal bond finance. In
1980, only three percent of municipal bond issues were insured,
but by 2007, sixty percent of all issues were insured." The
enormous growth in the use of bond insurers stems from the fact
that the credit rating for an insured municipal bond is based on
the credit of the insurer rather than the underlying credit of the
issuing municipality.5' Since bond insurers traditionally enjoyed
the highest credit ratings, issuing insured bonds was attractive
for any governmental issuer with a lower credit rating because
they would not have to pay a higher interest rate as a risk
premium.
As more local and state governments issued insured bonds,
competition among insurers for the growing business increased
and profit margins declined. In search of increased profits,
municipal bond insurers entered new markets, including the
novel mortgage backed securities being created on Wall Street.
We now know that neither the insurers nor the credit rating
agencies really understood the risks posed by these novel, and
increasingly complex, security instruments. When the real estate
market nosedived, leading to soaring default and foreclosures
rates, these securities proved to be far riskier than anyone had
believed, and the bond insurers suddenly faced huge
unanticipated liabilities. As losses mounted among bond
insurers, the credit rating agencies lowered the insurers' ratings
which, in turn, lowered the ratings - and raised the interest rate
Sept. 27, 2008, at B1, available at http://mobile.plaind.com/story.php?id=
7326655&pg=1 (noting Cleveland's foreclosure rate of 12.7%).
41 See, e.g., David Cho, Municipal Bond Deals Squeezed by Credit Crisis,
WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2007, at AO1.
50 Laura Lewis et al., Presentation before the Utah League of Cities & Towns:
Impact of Credit Crisis on Municipal Bond Markets 4 (Sept. 10, 2008), available
at http://www.ulct.org/ulct/docs/ulct_conference_101-sessionl.pdf.
51 James Surowiecki, Bonds Unbound, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 11, 2008,
available at
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2008/02/11/080 2 1 1tatalk_surowiecki.
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- on the municipal bonds they insure. 52
The growing problems in the financial and credit markets that
came to a head in September 2008 have further constricted access
to the municipal bond market. In early October, the New York
Times reported that cities, other local governments, and even
states, had been effectively shut out of the bond market since
mid-September. 3
Many cities thus face a nasty confluence of decreasing revenues
and increasing costs of borrowing. Some, including Chicago and
Miami-Dade County, have chosen to forego planned bond issues
rather than face the prospect of having to pay higher interest
rates.54 But cities that have imminent refinancing deadlines on
existing short-term borrowing do not have the option of delaying
and have no choice but to pay higher interest rates.55 Plus, when
cities forego borrowing for capital projects, they exacerbate their
declining revenue situation because they are also foregoing the
increased income and sales taxes that the economic spin-off from
their capital spending would have provided.
II. LONGER TERM EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS FOR LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
Predicting the future, at least without a reliable crystal ball, is
a perilous endeavor, particularly because we are facing a
financial crisis with an unprecedented amount of uncertainty as
to the extent of either its causes or effects. It may well be that
the $700 billion bailout will calm the financial markets, be
sufficient to prevent further collapses among insurers, banks and
investment houses, and perhaps even prove to be far less costly to
taxpayers than its $700 billion price tag when assets acquired by
the federal government over the next few weeks or months at
steep discounts are later sold at a profit. Such a "soft landing" is
52 See, e.g., John Doherty, Local Towns Borrow Trouble CNY Municipalities,
Schools Could Face Higher Lending Rates, Bond Insurer Blamed, SYRACUSE
POST STANDARD, June 18, 2008, at B3.
13 Mary Williams Walsh, Cities are Cutting Back Projects, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2008, at Al.
14 Cho, supra note 49. The same is true for state bond issues. See, e.g., Jay
Miller, Muni Bonds Suddenly Face Tepid Reception, CRAIN'S CLEV. BUS., Sept.
29, 2008, available at
http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20080929/MOBPRINT/309299963/1086
(showing that Ohio, for example, in late September, delayed a $300 million bond
issue due to lack of investor interest).
11 Miller, supra note 54.
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far from certain, however. The bailout seeks to stabilize the
financial and credit markets primarily by purchasing mortgage-
backed securities, the worth of which is highly suspect. But these
are not the only securities of questionable value that have been
created in recent years. The most recent report on the country's
financial markets from the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, issued September 26, 2008, noted that U.S. financial
institutions held over $15 trillion in credit default swap
derivatives at the end of the second quarter of 2008, and the
value of all financial derivatives held by these institutions was
$182 trillion.56
Without getting overly technical, financial derivatives are
financial instruments whose values depend on the value of other
underlying financial instruments, such as commodities, stocks,
bonds, or mortgages.57 These instruments are designed to lower
financial risk and/or leverage capital to any given financial actor.
However, they carry with them the potential for increased
systemic risk if financial markets are significantly disrupted.58
Former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan
acknowledged this risk in 1999 while discussing the explosive
growth of derivatives over the previous decade. 9 In the 2002
Annual Report of the Berkshire-Hathaway Corporation, Warren
Buffet expressed grave concerns about derivatives, describing
them as "time bombs, both for the parties that deal in them and
the economic system,"6" and sounding alarms about the systemic
risks that accompany an increased concentration of derivatives
trading by a small number of financial institutions and a
proliferation of increasingly exotic forms of derivatives.6' Both of
these conditions now exist.62
56 News Release, Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Reports Second Quarter
Bank Trading Revenue of $1.6 billion (Sept. 26, 2008) [hereinafter OCC],
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-115.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2008).
17 Peter S. Goodman, Taking Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at Al.
58 Alan Greenspan, Remarks before the Futures Industry Ass'n: Financial
Derivatives (Mar. 19, 1999).
59 Id.
60 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, INC., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2003), available at
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf.
61 Id. at 15.
62 The report issued Sept. 26, 2008 by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency noted that derivatives trading is now concentrated in a small number
of financial institutions. OCC, supra note 56. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, In
the Fed's Cross Hairs: Exotic Game, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, at BUl (noting
that the growth and proliferation of derivatives of every sort has long been noted
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Even if we do not see further turmoil in the financial and credit
markets caused by failures in the derivatives market, it is not at
all clear that the bailout legislation will provide much assistance
to local governments other than the effect of "a rising tide lifts all
ships." Arguably, the greatest help the federal government could
provide to local governments - outside of increasing the direct
financial support provided by the Neighborhood Stabilization
Program63 - would be to stabilize the housing market by actions
that would stem the tide of foreclosures and resulting property
vacancies. Theoretically, an easy way to accomplish this would
be for the federal government to use the control over the assets
acquired in the bailout to restructure mortgages in default.
As noted in a recent New York Times article, however, because
of the securitization of mortgages into large pools from which
bonds were issued with different levels of seniority to investors
throughout the world, it is unlikely that the federal government
will acquire all of the bonds that were issued from any given pool
of securitized mortgages.' Since modification of the underlying
mortgages in the pool would normally require the approval of all
holders of the affected mortgages, then the mortgages could not
be modified if that approval cannot be obtained for the reasons
suggested.65
Another approach to modifying the terms of defaulting
mortgages would be to change the federal bankruptcy law to
include primary residences, so that bankruptcy judges could
modify these mortgages in much the same way that they modify
the terms for other creditors of the debtor in bankruptcy.66
Democrats have been pushing for that change, but without
success to date.
In light of all of the above, and assuming that there is not a
systemic economic collapse similar to the Great Depression, it
seems fairly clear that cities like Buffalo, Cleveland and Detroit,
by observers).
63 See HUD, Methodology, supra note 45 (describing the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 2008).
6 Edmund L. Andrews, Housing Experts Say Bailout Proposal May Do Little
for Homeowners, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 23, 2008, at A22.
65 Id.
66 In Chapter 13 bankruptcies, which are most commonly declared by
individuals, debt on a primary residence may not be restructured. 11 U.S.C. §
1322(b)(2) (2006). A bankruptcy court may "modify the rights of holders of
secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real
property that is the debtor's principal residence .... " Id. (emphasis added).
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which were already suffering from weak employment and housing
markets before the current crisis, will have far more serious and
prolonged effects than cities like Las Vegas and Phoenix which
had strong economies before the current crisis.
Cities that enjoyed a relatively good employment rate and
housing market before the crisis will suffer the short term effects
discussed above and a depressed housing market for some time as
excess inventory is slowly absorbed. Once the economy begins to
recover and these cities begin to produce new jobs again, however,
they will attract new residents and their housing markets will
slowly rebound. The outlook for cities whose economies were
weak before the crisis is far less bright.
In these "weak market" cities,67 the "current" crisis actually
began much earlier.
Cleveland, Ohio, for example, was one of the first cities to face
a serious problem in its housing market. There, the combination
of a weak housing market, job losses, and abusive "predatory
lending," led to a significant spike in foreclosures - and sharp
increases in the number of abandoned properties - beginning in
2003.68 As early as 2000, however, community groups were seeing
their neighborhood revitalization efforts undermined by
unscrupulous mortgage brokers who flooded vulnerable - and
largely minority - neighborhoods with "high-risk loans, many of
which were predatory and fraudulent."69  The problem was
further exacerbated by an epidemic of property "flipping" by
speculators. 7
Cities like Cleveland face only difficult choices. Cleveland
itself has 10,000 abandoned homes and there were more than
27,000 foreclosures in surrounding Cuyahoga County over the
last two years.7 Both the city and the county have been losing
population for decades: between 2000 and 2007, Cuyahoga
County "lost more people-both in numbers and as a percentage
67 The Brookings Institution has termed older cities with weak employment
and housing markets "weak market" cities. Bruce Katz, Presentation before the
Brookings Institution: Revitalizing Weak Market Cities in the U.S. 15, 38 (Oct.
10, 2008) available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/speeches/2006/
0508citieskatz/20060508_WeakMarketCities.pdf.
68 See, e.g., Lind, supra note 10, at 239 (providing a first-hand look at certain
Cleveland neighborhoods devastated by the mortgage finance system).
69 Id. at 238-39.
70 Id.
71 Jerry Zremski, Swamped by a Subprime Tsunami - Cleveland Hit Hard by
Mortgage Crises, but Buffalo Appears to Have Been Spared, BUFF. NEWS, Mar. 7,
2008, at Al.
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of its population-than any of America's 100 largest counties."72
There is little expectation that these trends will slow, let alone
reverse.
Other cities that face similar demographic trends have little
choice but to adopt a strategic planning and investment
approach. It will simply be impossible to "save" all neighborhoods
that have been devastated by property abandonment. Limited
resources should be deployed strategically, paying close attention
to which neighborhoods have the existing housing stock and
community amenities to compete for a pool of purchasers that had
been shrinking even before credit standards tightened.
Inevitably, this strategy will leave significant areas where parcels
are abandoned, unmarketable or vacant. Cities facing that
inevitability may want to consider working with other local
government officials to establish a multi-jurisdiction land
reutilization authority - a land bank - to assist in the recovery of
such land, an approach pioneered by the Genesee County Land
Bank Authority in Flint, Michigan.74
CONCLUSION
The current housing/credit crisis poses serious problems for
local government. In the short run, cities will face diminished
revenues, increased costs, and restrictions on access to credit.
Moreover, these three factors are likely to exhibit a negative
synergy, with each exacerbating the problems of the others. In
the longer run, and assuming that we can avoid a depression-like
financial crisis, cities that have been faring well economically are
likely to recover from the current difficulties relatively quickly
once the economy rebounds and growth-induced housing demand
reduces the current over-supply. The picture is far less rosy for
"weak market" cities that were struggling with weak job and
72 Posting of Robert L. Smith to
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2008/03/cuyahoga countys-populationdr.html,
(Mar. 20, 2008, 00:09 EST).
73 See, e.g., FRANK S. ALEXANDER, LAND BANK AUTHORITIES: A GUIDE FOR THE
CREATION AND OPERATION OF LOCAL LAND BANKS 4, 5 (2005).
14 The critical features of the Genesee approach are: a county-wide scope,
financial self-sufficiency, efficient procedures for clearing titles, protection of
owner-occupants in tax foreclosures, and land reutilization based on benefit to
the public. See generally Genesee County Land Bank,
http://www.thelandbank.org/aboutus.asp (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) (describing
how the Genesee County Land Bank has taken advantage of new tax law in
Michigan to stabilize and revitalize the City of Flint).
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housing markets even before the current crisis. These cities will
face difficult choices about where to invest diminished resources
and will need to look at new approaches, such as land banking, to
revitalize neighborhoods devastated by the fallout from the crisis.
